Today I will review Hyflux -- the darling who created Singapore's NEWater. CEO Olivia Lum was a household name when she quitted school to start her company to make this first-of-a-kind Singapore-made water filtration technology because I own 30 units of 6% Cumulative Preference Shares (CPS) which I bought via an IPO in 2011. The structure was such that you get paid $6/year for every $100 unit held for 7 years. Upon maturity, Hyflux either redeems your capital or extends the tenure by a duration to be determined but at a 8% rate. The main reason why I bought it was because it was like a bond, and we have limited bond choices as retail investors.
Last week, this said CPS was trading below par value, or $100. The lowest was $93. Over the past 6 years holding this CPS, the price had been always at least $100. That pompted me to dig little deeper into its financial report.
The company is debt-laden. Debt/Equity (D/E) ratio is 80 as at Jun 2016. The lower the better. There are many other companies who fare much worse, so don't be too alarmed. There are other companies with similar preference shares holding much much much more debt (about 4 times more than Hyflux), for e.g. Oxley holdings (D/E = 348). Aspial's DE = 208. Basically I had divested all my shares in any company whose D/E ratio is above 50 because the economy is undergoing a lot of change and companies with high debt will likely have difficulties changing because they may not have the money to make the moves they want.
Top 10 D/E companies extracted from SGX Stockfacts |
Anyway, back to Hyflux. After going through the financial report, the line item that is burning their cash is something I don't really understand, this term called "service concession arrangement". After doing a Google search, I seem to understand it as a maintenance agreement to manage and operate the water/energy plant after Hyflux constructs it. Hyflux owns the rights to manage and operate and these rights can be sold to other operators. However, as the filtration technology is proprietary to Hyflux, I am not sure whether there are patent or rights income because I don't see it anywhere in the financial report.
The other thing I was trying to identify was the profit margin to operate the plants. In 1H2015, profit margin (before tax) was 22%. in 1H2016, profit margin (before tax) was 2%. I seriously hope that I am misinterpreting the report. What happened over 1 year? 2 projects started, so higher revenue had been recorded, however, expenses are also very high as these are construction costs (~S$300M). The 2 projects are: TuasOne waste-to-energy (“WTE”) project (to be completed in 2019, client NEA) and Qurayyat Independent Water Project (“IWP”) in the Sultanate of Oman (to be completed in 2017, client Oman gov). This S$300M is likely the "service concession arrangement" line item on the cash flow sheet. In terms of reporting, I would have preferred the project expenses and loans to be tracked separately to show that their cash flow issues are purely because of the projects.
My conclusion is that Hyflux' negative cash flow issues are due to project construction costs. However, this is not conclusive as the company chooses not to separate the development and maintenance business. I still have faith to hold on to my CPS. If I were the Hyflux CEO, I will probably want to report my revenue, expense, debt, profit by the business nature. In terms of construction projects, I will also require my clients to pay me more upfront to manage my cash flow better. I probably prefer to buy the CPS that guarantees the 6% payout than to buy Hyflux equity ($0.51, 1.2 cents dividend or 2.3% yield) whose dividend is currently heavily penalised because of negative cash flow.
The writer owns Hyflux CPS 6% at the time of writing.